poster
Authors: Zhili Chen, Lin Chen, Liusheng Huang, and Hong Zhong
MobiHoc '16: Proceedings of the 17th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing
July 2016
Pages 361 - 362
Published: 05 July 2016 Publication History
- 2citation
- 157
- Downloads
Metrics
Total Citations2Total Downloads157Last 12 Months2
Last 6 weeks0
New Citation Alert added!
This alert has been successfully added and will be sent to:
You will be notified whenever a record that you have chosen has been cited.
To manage your alert preferences, click on the button below.
Manage my Alerts
New Citation Alert!
Please log in to your account
Get Access
- Get Access
- References
- Media
- Tables
- Share
Abstract
Truthful spectrum auctions make bidders reveal their true valuations for spectrum to maximize their utilities. However, disclosure of one's true value causes numerous security vulnerabilities. Moreover, as a distinguished property of spectrum auction compared to classical auctions, spectrum reutilisation requires that the bidder locations be disclosed to the auctioneer to run the auction. We investigate the impact of disclosing bidder locations and demonstrate that such disclosure can be exploited by a malicious auctioneer to gain extra profit and significantly degrade bidders' utility.
We then design a provably secure spectrum auction framework that does not leak any information on either bids or bidder locations other than the auction outcome. Technically, we leverage tools in garbled circuits and secret sharing, and design data-oblivious algorithms where the execution path does not depend on the input. We further implement our solution and theoretically and experimentally show that it incurs only limited computation and communication overhead.
References
[1]
X. Zhou, S. Gandhi, S. Suri, and H. Zheng. ebay in the sky: Strategyproof wireless spectrum auctions. In Proc. of MobiCom, pages 2--13, 2008.
Digital Library
[2]
Y. Huang, D. Evans, J. Katz, and L. Malka. Faster secure two-party computation using garbled circuits. In Proc. USENIX Security, 2011.
Digital Library
Cited By
View all
- Chen ZNi TZhong HZhang SCui J(2019)Differentially Private Double Spectrum Auction With Approximate Social Welfare MaximizationIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security10.1109/TIFS.2019.290807014:11(2805-2818)Online publication date: Nov-2019
- Chen ZXuemei Wei Zhong HJie Cui Yan Xu Shun Zhang (2017)Secure, efficient and practical double spectrum auction2017 IEEE/ACM 25th International Symposium on Quality of Service (IWQoS)10.1109/IWQoS.2017.7969153(1-6)Online publication date: Jun-2017
Index Terms
Towards secure spectrum auction: both bids and bidder locations matter: poster
Security and privacy
Network security
Security protocols
Recommendations
- Differentially private spectrum auction with approximate revenue maximization
MobiHoc '14: Proceedings of the 15th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Dynamic spectrum redistribution---under which spectrum owners lease out under-utilized spectrum to users for financial gain---is an effective way to improve spectrum utilization. Auction is a natural way to incentivize spectrum owners to share their idle ...
Read More
- Adaptive Auction Framework for Spectrum Market in Cognitive Radio Networks
For the recent decade, cognitive radio networks have received much attention as an alternative to the traditional static spectrum allocation policy since the licensed spectrum channels are not being used efficiently. The most critical issue of the ...
Read More
- PPS: Privacy-Preserving Strategyproof Social-Efficient Spectrum Auction Mechanisms
Many spectrum auction mechanisms have been proposed for spectrum allocation problem, and unfortunately, few of them protect the bid privacy of bidders and achieve good social efficiency. In this paper, we propose PPS, a Privacy Preserving Strategyproof ...
Read More
Comments
Information & Contributors
Information
Published In
MobiHoc '16: Proceedings of the 17th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing
July 2016
421 pages
ISBN:9781450341844
DOI:10.1145/2942358
- General Chairs:
- Falko Dressler
Paderborn University
, - Friedhelm Meyer auf der Heide
Paderborn University
Copyright © 2016 Owner/Author.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.
Sponsors
- SIGMOBILE: ACM Special Interest Group on Mobility of Systems, Users, Data and Computing
- ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
New York, NY, United States
Publication History
Published: 05 July 2016
Check for updates
Author Tags
- privacy
- security
- spectrum auction
Qualifiers
- Poster
Conference
MobiHoc'16
Sponsor:
- SIGMOBILE
- ACM
MobiHoc'16: The Seventeenth ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing
July 5 - 8, 2016
Paderborn, Germany
Acceptance Rates
Overall Acceptance Rate 296 of 1,843 submissions, 16%
Contributors
Other Metrics
View Article Metrics
Bibliometrics & Citations
Bibliometrics
Article Metrics
- View Citations
2
Total Citations
157
Total Downloads
- Downloads (Last 12 months)2
- Downloads (Last 6 weeks)0
Other Metrics
View Author Metrics
Citations
Cited By
View all
- Chen ZNi TZhong HZhang SCui J(2019)Differentially Private Double Spectrum Auction With Approximate Social Welfare MaximizationIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security10.1109/TIFS.2019.290807014:11(2805-2818)Online publication date: Nov-2019
- Chen ZXuemei Wei Zhong HJie Cui Yan Xu Shun Zhang (2017)Secure, efficient and practical double spectrum auction2017 IEEE/ACM 25th International Symposium on Quality of Service (IWQoS)10.1109/IWQoS.2017.7969153(1-6)Online publication date: Jun-2017
View Options
Get Access
Login options
Check if you have access through your login credentials or your institution to get full access on this article.
Sign in
Full Access
Get this Publication
View options
View or Download as a PDF file.
PDFeReader
View online with eReader.
eReaderMedia
Figures
Other
Tables
Download PDF
View Table of Contents
